Book Review: Fortune’s Formula

When a friend of ours headed to the World Series of Poker last summer mentioned basing his bet size on Fortune’s Formula, and we gave him a semi-blank stare – he told us to go pick up the book Fortune’s Formula: The Untold Story of the Scientific Betting System That Beat the Casinos and Wall Street by William Poundstone. So we did. And are we glad we did. Talk about breadth of subject. How about tying in information theory, mobsters, Ivan Boesky, Long Term Capital Management, Rudy Giuliani, and “beat the dealer” in blackjack?

William Poundstone’s book is ostensibly about the Kelly Criterion, a formula used to calculate the optimal bet size given one knows their probability of winning and the payout odds for a winning bet. An example from Wikipedia: if a gamble has a 60% chance of winning (p = 0.60, q = 0.40), but the gambler receives 1-to-1 odds on a winning bet (b = 1), then the gambler should bet 20% of the bankroll at each opportunity (f* = 0.20), in order to maximize the long-run growth rate of the bankroll.

But the real story is the historical characters laid out therein.

There is Claude Shannon – the father of information theory whom Poundstone argues was on Einstein’s level. Ed Thorp, who adapted the Kelly Criterion to card counting and playing blackjack to several successful hedge funds. There is mobster Manny Kimmel, who turned a parking lot won in a craps game into a parking lot company which eventually bought film studio Warner Brothers, which eventually became Warner Communications, and eventually merged with Time Inc. to create the Time Warner whose internet connection you might be using right now. There is the story of a young Rudy Giuliani fighting crime in New York. There is Boesky and Milken and Merton Shcoles and Fisher and Black and Merriwhether. And a great Warren Buffet fable about every person in the US flipping coins we hadn’t seen before.

Then there are the lessons gleaned. Such as why insider trading is so appealing to those utilizing the Kelly criterion (because the odds of success go way up), and how overbetting even on a positive expectancy outcome can result in ruin. There is talk about the failings of VaR and Black Scholes and Long Term Capital Management. And there is the overarching lesson of the Kelly Criterion that risking a fraction of your bankroll (investment amount) on each successive “bet” removes the risk of ruin (ignoring minimum investments or table minimums, and the like) while providing the largest possible long term growth.

Below is the graph from the book comparing four money management systems using a  simple example of even money bets with a 55% chance of winning. You can see the brief flame out of the bet it all bettor. The deceivingly smooth line of the Martingale bettor (if you lose, bet double the next time) except for the large drawdown during a losing streak, the slow and steady gains of the fixed wager – and finally the volatile but largest gainer in the Kelly method. (Excuse the quality of the image – it was pulled from somewhere on Google and likely a scan from the book, not created digitally by us.)

We couldn’t help but keep thinking back to systematic trading models in the managed futures space in reading the book, because fractional betting on the ongoing bankroll is how managed futures operate for the most part: risking a fraction of the investor’s ongoing account on each trade so as to reduce trading during a losing streak and compound winning by larger bet sizes during winning streaks. We know two things for sure. One, we’ll be adding this book to our list of market favorites, and two, we’ll be asking managers we talk to from here on out their views on the Kelly Criterion are… and docking them a few points if we get that blank stare back.

Corzine at Fault… Again (We Know!)

Another missive on MF Global that we can drop straight into the “things we already knew” file: a new report from trustee Louis Freeh alleges that Jon Corzine was largely responsible for the downfall of the company. Not exactly shocking material, and quite a bit of it is simply a re-hash of other reports on the subject, but it does contribute to the mountains of damning evidence against Corzine.

Although none of the reports thus far have gone so far as to allege criminal misconduct for the “honorable” Mr. Corzine, it’s quite clear at this point that his hands-on approach and penchant for big trades were too much for a firm that lacked even the most basic of risk controls. From the report:

When Corzine’s vision was implemented, the Company’s deficiencies were exposed in a number of ways:

(1) there was no efficient, concise way for anyone at the Company to have an accurate and complete real-time snapshot of the Company’s most basic financial information, including liquidity;

(2) inefficient and outdated control systems were inundated as trading increased, crippling the settlement and clearing of trades, which became a decisive threat to MFGI’s ability to function during the last week of October 2011; and

(3) the inability to forecast and track financial information accurately on a real-time basis resulted in executive management reacting too late and too slowly to the growing liquidity pressures placed on the Company by the Euro RTMs and Corzine’s new trading desks.

As early as May 2010, Corzine and Steenkamp knew that MF Global’s control architecture was flawed. Gaps between approved risk and control policies and current practices were documented, distributed to management, and presented to the Board. Repeated warnings about the Company’s control systems put management on notice that the Company did not have the appropriate systems in place to support the expanded trading Corzine envisioned when he joined the Company.

Much of it is a recap of information that has already been outlined in previous reports, but you can check out some of the reactions to the report here and here. Coincidentally, Judge Glenn of the Manhattan Bankruptcy Court approved a final liquidation plan for MF Global Holdings today, confirming that the vast majority of customer money will be recouped. Corzine getting the blame (although sadly no jail time) and customers getting most of their money back… all things considered, not the worst ending to this tale we could have imagined back in October 2011.

Even if news like this doesn’t put Corzine behind bars, it will certainly aid the civil case against him. Of course Corzine’s defenders (yes, they exist) dismiss these autopsies as “Monday morning quarterbacking,” and like to point out that if MF Global hadn’t been sunk by margin calls and liquidity problems, those bit bets on European debt would have paid off. But that’s the rub – “I would have been right” doesn’t count for much, and even less so when you bankrupt a company and risk other people’s money with your recklessness.

A Mountain from a Mediterranean Molehill

You could be forgiven for thinking that the last few economic/financial “crises” haven’t felt very crisis-like. The dreaded sequester came and went without causing so much as a hiccup, and even the Italian election fiasco proved insufficient for more than a minor stumble in the market’s trajectory. But Europe seems intent on maintaining their new annual tradition of stirring up investor anxiety every spring. Enter: Cyprus.

Cyprus may be bigger than a molehill, but not by much. The fact that this much digital ink is being spilled worrying about a country with a GDP the size of mid-sized US city shows just how far we have to reach to find something dire to talk about these days. The country’s entire economy is a rounding error compared to the US federal budget…

Nevertheless, the airwaves are filled with concern that this could spark contagion, reignite the European debt crisis, and so on and so forth. Next verse, same as the first. At the end of the day, Cyprus matters precisely as much as people believe it matters, regardless of how much we think it ought to. And that means the possibility of choppy markets that have been the bane of many CTAs over the last several years.

But amidst the noise, we were pleased to see someone else who shared our frame of mind on such matters:

If you’re a trend follower like me, well this is one of those times when you need to be all over your risk management, because events like this have a habit of reversing or rapidly accelerating existing trends, so you need to stay alert for stops, and let your winners run until you get your exit. Stay focused. Despite the drama, this market is still in a solid uptrend.

Don’t expect this to die down quickly either. Right now the market doesn’t like this. If the vote doesn’t pass it will be a relief, but then that will put the entire aid package in jeopardy and then we’ll be back to the whole news cycle of waiting to hear it’s solved before we can move on. The media loves that stuff. Don’t be a slave to it.

The fact is, you have no edge trading off of news from Cyprus. You only have your system, your strategy, your process, your discipline. Stick with it. Follow whatever it gives you. Ignore the noise. Don’t watch TV. Watch price.

Sound advice in our book. Whatever comes of Cyprus, some prognosticators will be correct and some will be incorrect. But the traders with a sound system and solid risk management will be ready to capture a big trend if it arrives, or cut losses short if it doesn’t. Whether Cyprus causes just another ripple in the ocean or the tidal wave that the bears have been predicting for years – we’ll be glad we have our seat belt fastened.

The Gundlach Constant

Some hedge fund bigwigs generate headlines with live arguments on CNBC, but Jeff Gundlach of Doubleline (while not exactly a ‘hedge fund guy’) has been opting instead to make huge – and for the most part, uncannily accurate – calls on various markets. These calls (what we have called the “Gundlach Spreads”) have generated a fair bit of buzz, and now there’s a piece from Business Insider quoting him on another catchy investing idea – something he calls Gundlach’s Rule of Investment Risk.

If you run things and you try to get them very smooth, without ever any downside, you’re trying essentially to eliminate the frequency of problems.  I believe the frequency of problems times the severity of problems when they occur equals a constant.  Frequency times severity equals a constant.

Essentially – he is saying that there is one pain point, and it is a constant. And it can be arrived at via frequent but small downside, or infrequent but large downside. Business Inside breaks it down in terms of the economy, saying the idea is essentially that you can have 1) frequent, yet shallow recessions or 2) infrequent, yet deeper recessions.

Now that sounds a lot like the description we give of managed futures and their long volatility profile – whereby they accept small but frequent losses for large but infrequent gains. Conversely, short volatility programs such as option sellers trade off small but frequent wins for large but infrequent losses. Throw in a little bit of Nassim Taleb’s thoughts on randomness happening lot more in financial markets than you would think, and you can see why we believe it is such a good idea to be on the side where you can benefit from these large outlier moves.

But Gundlach takes the idea a bit further by saying the frequency vs. severity difference is a constant. What that means for long volatility type programs is the less frequent the big moves are, the larger the next move is going to be – so that the frequency times severity equals the same number.  This meshes well with our experience watching markets and managed futures programs over the years, whereby the big moves often come out of the quiet periods. Just look at the Japanese Yen’s recent move, where that market followed 5 months of being in a tight 3% range with a decline of 16%.  As we read Gundlach’s “Rule” – with the frequency of “problems” nearly zero in the Yen during the quiet period, the magnitude of the next “problem” had to be much bigger in order for the frequency*severity to equal the constant.

Gundlach’s message appears to be that the Fed’s machinations are suppressing the frequency of problems, meaning the severity of those problems will be that much bigger when they come. The question then – is whether the Fed can suppress the frequency indefinitely to escape the severity.  Put us in the doubtful camp.

5 Ways to Lose All of Your (AAPL) Money

Apple’s surge and descent became a fixture of the financial commentariat over the last couple of years. It was tough to make it a full day without hearing some discussion of the company’s stock price, products, or plans for the future (we even got in on the act here, here, and here). Now a piece from CNN Money has been making the rounds, detailing the rise and fall of a hedge fund/investing advice newsletter run by someone named Andy Zaky. His “hedge fund” – if you can call it that – made its rise and fall entirely through investments in the Cupertino company (can we call it a Hedge Apple Fund?), and the lurid details are enough to make even Josh Brown wince.

It’s tempting to just shake our heads in pity for the folks who were burned by this “expert” advice and move on, but reading the article it becomes clear that the mistakes in this case are the same ones that we run into over and over again with investors everywhere – even in managed futures. We think it’s worth taking the time to pick over the coroner’s report here and identify some of the bright red warning flags that should have sent investors running for their lives.

Know Your Exit
Getting into a trade is the easy part. Exiting before the music stops and the chairs are all gone is what separates the legends from the paupers. In the waning months, Zaky’s fund was evidently doing little or nothing to hedge against the possibility that his aggressive options trading strategy might go wrong. Granted, he was going long and short with his Apple positions, but the fund experienced troubling losses in March of 2012 that should have set alarm bells ringing.

Track Records Matter
There’s a reason why people want to see a solid record of performance before they invest – they want to know that a manager is more than just a flash in the pan. It’s why we don’t include managers for consideration until they have 36 months of performance data for us to review. And when it came to Zaky, a few right calls on Apple in a newsletter is no substitute for a track record. It can’t give you a sense of what happened between his calls: did he panic when it went down before going up?  A track record is a vital source of information about a manger – and a newsletter service isn’t remotely the same as managing client money and going through all of the emotional and logistical stress that comes along with that. You can’t know whether his calls were dumb luck or skill.

As Nassim Taleb (among others) has pointed out – the skill of this guy’s 5 for 5 picks on Apple could have been nothing more than luck. With hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of people throwing out Apple price predictions, some of them were bound to be right, much like the proverbial dart-throwing monkey. Without a sufficient track record, that’s the chance you’re taking.

Greed Kills
At one point, the article estimates Zaky’s fund was up nearly 400%, before plummeting to a loss of nearly -93%. That’s not a -93% drawdown from the peak, either (which would equate to something like a -65% to -70% loss) but a 93% loss from the starting equity:

Chart courtesy CNN Money. Disclaimer: past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.

Whether it was his ego getting in the way or the intoxicating effect of a hot streak, the fund kept trying to hit a home run on every swing. In effect, his options strategy represented huge hidden leverage – and no matter how talented you are, no one can keep up a perfect record forever.

Setting a Line in the Sand
Most traders have some kind of line in the sand, a point at which they will simply walk away from a trade gone bad, no matter how smart it seemed in the beginning. This is always the risk of going with a discretionary money manager… there’s a chance they’ll get married to a particular trade, refuse to get out while it’s still possible, and go down with the ship.

We saw this a couple of years ago with Dighton Capital’s bet on the Swiss Franc. They remained in the trade (and in fact, doubled down) as the losses piled up. The thing is, even is the manager is proven right eventually (as Dighton was, and Zaky very well could be), being right doesn’t help you if you’re wiped out before you get there.

Style Drift
By the author’s estimation, Zaky wasn’t even following his own advice when it came to his Apple investments. His original advice had been steeped in caution, his newsletter emphasizing his belief in minimizing risk. But after a couple of stumbles in the fund, whatever caution had originally been there apparently vanished.

The problem here, of course, is that style drift is notoriously difficult to identify with a hedge fund. Fortunately, there are warning signs that due diligence can watch out for with CTAs to alert investors when a manager is no longer sticking with the strategy that they once did. Simply put, when a manager stops following their own advice, it’s probably a good time to locate and secure your emergency flotation device.

It’s sad to see people lose their retirement funds or their livelihoods on blowups like this, but at least when it happens to someone else, it gives us a chance to learn from their mistakes. And in most cases, we find that the post-mortem analysis reveals the exact dangers we warn about and watch for on a regular basis.

Fat Tails and Tall Heads

One of the bigger CTAs in the business – Transtrend – recently released their 2012 review newsletter, and of particular interest to us was their discussion of the often ignored “Tall Head” aspect of kurtosis. Now, most people aren’t even discussing Kurtosis, much less different aspects of Kurtosis – but you don’t get to $8 billion under management without knowing a thing or two about math.

As a refresher, Kurtosis is a term that refers to the shape of a statistical distribution. The normal shape is a bell curve, and we often hear of kurtosis when talking about “fat tails,” or outlier readings in a statistical distribution which make the edges of the bell curve upwards.  In investing, a fat tail on the left side is a bad thing, as that is an outlier loss greater than expected given a normal distribution.

We illustrated this a while back by comparing the historical daily returns of the S&P 500 to a randomly-generated set of returns that followed a normal distribution. You can see that there are many more ticks (readings) above 3% and below -3% than would be expected in the normal curve. Kurtosis is the statistic which measures that phenomenon.

Disclaimer: past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.

But what we didn’t touch on in our look at this graph was the tall head associated with the large kurtosis distribution. You can clearly see in the chart above that the middle of the distribution is a lot taller than the normal curve. Indeed, that is the defining characteristic of the graph, versus the barely noticeable fat tails.

Transtrend does a wonderful job of explaining that the “fat tails” everyone worries about (and invests in managed futures to protect against) are a result of supposedly volatility-reducing “tall heads.” When adding in small or zero returns to a distribution (say, by government intervention), the curve gets pinched in the middle, pushing the head up and tails out. Voila, fat tails.

In Transtrend’s words:

[after adding in 0% returns]… we now have a return series with a smaller standard deviation, but with the same risk. Where does the ‘missing’ risk hide? Precisely: in a higher kurtosis. All these 0% return days form a high peak…this peak pulls the distribution ‘inward’ (i.e., like we have seen above, the standard deviation downwards), causing the returns on the outsides to now overshoot the Normal curve. There we have our ‘fat tails.’

What we see here is the exchange of standard deviation for kurtosis. The risk stays the same, but through the lower standard deviation it is more treacherous. It is now hidden in the higher kurtosis. Remember we did not increase the kurtosis by a direct addition of tail-risk, but by adding an (in itself not dangerous) high peak. To those who are not alert to this phenomenon, such a high peak may give a false sense of security.

They continue on to point out that outside intrusion in the markets (such as central bank interventions) tend to generate those higher peaks – with the government artificially absorbing part of the risk, which contributes to a higher-than-normal share of “small move” days. Managed futures, in turn, tends to struggle during these “small move” periods, and shine when larger moves, further out on the tails, take place. They explain this is especially true when looking at longer time series – say, monthly returns rather than daily. (Transtrend left out that their size precludes them from participating in a meaningful way in some markets (grains) which did see big moves, but that’s a discussion for another day).

Finally – they make a nice comparison explaining tall heads and fat tails to building architecture:

The interaction between deviation and kurtosis is well known in building engineering. In the Netherlands the top floors of high-rise office buildings sway a couple of meters when it storms. It is really not that hard to construct buildings that are less flexible. But they would not be safer. Better bend than break. In physics terms: a choice between stiffness and strength. During earthquakes the least flexible buildings are the first to collapse. Every now and then a ‘resident’ may complain about this scary swaying, but no architect will take this complaint seriously.

Are global markets currently stiff or flexible? That is the big question.  Transtrend would have us believe that the current “tall head” environment means we’re living in a stiff building, ready to break at the first sign of tremors.  We heartily agree.

Afraid? You will be… you will be

Last week, amidst the internet-wide reminiscing about the October 1987 stock market crash, we joined in with our own take on the lessons of that day. However, one of our readers and a blog author himself – Michael Harris – raised a few points of contention with our post. Since there are few things we love more than a good debate, we decided to continue the conversation.

In truth, we don’t really think there’s much disagreement. Michael’s main point is this: if you’re too afraid of a 1987-style crash taking place, you won’t take the kinds of risks necessary to obtain a respectable return:

Suppose a trader with $100K gets a long signal for SPY, the ETF that tracks the S&P 500 index. The trader can tolerate a drop of 2% in his bankroll for this particular trade. The entry price is at $145 and he will exit with a loss if the price gets to $140 or with a profit if the price gets to $150. It is easy to calculate that the position size to accomplish his risk and reward objectives is 400 shares, although he could actually purchase a total of 690 shares with his capital based on entry price.

Now, let us see what happens if after reading some book about rare events the trader gets scared and he wants to factor in the possibility that while his position is open, SPY can drop 20% in one day, just like the S&P 500 index did back in 1987. In this case, it is easy to calculate that he should buy only 69 shares, one order of magnitude less than what he could buy if fully invested. Of course, this diminishes any potential for profit from a good signal. If the previous case, the purchase of 400 shares allowed a potential 2% gain (400 shares x $5). In this case, the potential for profit is only 69 shares x $5 = $345.

On this point, we agree. There’s also a non-zero chance that the Earth will be hit by a meteor tomorrow and we’ll all be wiped out – but you can’t just give up and crawl in a hole. You have to live your life, even knowing there is a greater than 0% probability that the sun won’t come up tomorrow. And knowing that the market might plummet tomorrow doesn’t mean that you should keep 99% of your money under your mattress, either.

But – that doesn’t mean that you should ignore the fat tails completely. Instead, you should have a contingency plan. After all, NASA has worked on plans to save us from a doomsday asteroid. Our main goal is to criticize overconfidence in the predictability of markets. Talk to Long Term Capital Management, Lehman Brothers, or AIG about the risk of ignoring fat tails…

Wise investing involves knowing the market can crash, and adjusting your strategy accordingly (rather than practicing buy, hold, and hope). What we’re advocating is akin to bringing an umbrella when there is a small chance of rain, or keeping a spare tire in your car. A happy medium – where you realize that the ultra-rare catastrophe is much more likely than a normally-distributed curve would have you believe, but you don’t allow that risk to keep you locked up in your house all day, afraid to go outside. And in the end, that’s pretty much what Michael’s is advocating, too:

A better suggestion is to never risk money that you cannot afford to lose.  This takes care of any rare event that can occur. Even better is this one: Risk only half of what you can afford to lose and keep the other half in case of rare events. Actually, rare events present great opportunities for those who have kept cash aside. This is another reason such events cannot be called “black” whatever in general.

When you recommend only trading money you can afford to lose (or only ½ the money you can afford to lose), you are applying the knowledge that market returns are not normally distributed. You are protecting against a worst-case scenario – so in the end, his conclusion is same as ours.

And, as Michael points out, “black swan” events need not be disasters for everyone – indeed; they can be excellent opportunities for those who are prepared. When we talk about investing during a drawdown – that’s viewing one person’s pain as another’s opportunity. We don’t bring up black swans to try to scare people out of the market – but rather, to get investors thinking about how to prepare before the crisis strikes.

Powered By Mow - Wordpress Popup Plugin